As you have read in these pages, Joe Arpaio through his attorney, has filed a motion to disqualify federal district judge G. Murray Snow, in the racial profiling case of Melendres v. Arpaio. The motion, “Motion for Recusal or Disqualification of District Court Judge G. Murray Snow,” invokes two federal statutes: 28 USC § 455 and 28 USC § 144. You can read about those in my article, Sheriff Joe cries “uncle”!
Invoking § 144 is a problem. Here is the statute:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.
The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be shown for failure to file it within such time. A party may file only one such affidavit in any case. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith.
Note the highlighted portion: “A party may file only one such affidavit in any case.” The problem is that this not the first § 144 motion filed by Arpaio in this case. Let’s set the Wayback machine a thousand documents or so back in the Melendres docket to February 23, 2009, when the Melendres case was under a different judge, U.S. District Judge Mary Murguia. Arpaio filed a motion for recusal then:
Defendants Joseph M. Arpaio, Maricopa County, and the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455, and also pursuant to Rule 83.5, Local Rules for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, respectfully submit this Motion for Recusal.
That’s why the current judge is someone without a Latino surname, G. Murray Snow. Filing TWICE under 28 USC § 144 appears to this writer to be a huge legal blunder.